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1988] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
that the exception was unwisely extended to the executor-benefi-
ciary relationship, and that application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel in such instances would produce results more consistent
with the recognized intent behind limitations periods.
Kevin Murphy
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 214(2): Three-year statute of limitations provision for stat-
utorily-created causes of action is applicable to a claim by an es-
tate under the Dram Shop Act rather than the two-year period
for wrongful death actions in EPTL § 5-4.1
At common law, the victim of an alcohol-related accident had
no recourse against a commercial vendor of intoxicating liquors.'
In response to the troublesome problem of drunk driving,2 many
states, including New York,3 have extended liability to vendors
See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 83, 518 N.E.2d 896, 898, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3
(1987); see also Fox v. Mercer, 109 App. Div. 2d 59, 60, 489 N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (4th Dep't
1985) ("The Dram Shop Act created a cause of action unknown at common law by allowing
recovery against a tavern owner for injuries caused as a result of patron's intoxication
.... "); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 App. Div. 2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (3d Dep't 1980)
("Under the common law, no tort cause of action lay against one who furnished, whether by
sale or by gift, intoxicating liquor to a person who thereby became intoxicated ... ."). Com-
mon law courts refused to recognize liability of a commercial vendor because "[e]xcessive
alcohol consumption was deemed to be the proximate cause of injuries produced by the
inebriate; selling or furnishing alcohol to an adult who elected to become intoxicated was
not viewed as the root of the resulting harm." D'Amico, 71 N.Y.2d at 83, 518 N.E.2d at 898,
524 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
2 See Note, A Response to Deficiencies in Illinois Dramshop Liability, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REv. 837, 837. The problem was especially ripe for a statutory solution, given the prevalence
of alcohol-related fatalities. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFC SAFETY ADMIN., FATAL Accimi.rr
REPORTING SYSTEM 1986, at 2-2. In 1986, it was estimated that 23,990 traffic accident fatali-
ties were alcohol-related. Id. Although this was a five percent decrease from 1982, it was in
fact a seven percent increase over the proportion of alcohol-related deaths occurring in 1985.
Id.
In response to the serious problem of drunk driving, President Reagan, in 1983, insti-
tuted the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. See Comment, Server vs. Driver Lia-
bility: A Suggested Change to Reduce Drinking and Driving, 7 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 257, 257
(1987). "The Commission found that at least 50 percent of all highway deaths involve the
use of alcohol" and that "the annual economic loss is estimated at 21 billion dollars." Id.
3 See GOL § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1989). The statute provides that
1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or
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through Dram Shop Acts.4 While New York's Dram Shop Act es-
otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any per-
son, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any
person who shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor
for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication; and
in any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary
damages.
2. In case of the death of either party, the action or right of action given by
this section shall survive to or against his or her executor or administrator, and
the amount so recovered by either a husband, wife or child shall be his or her sole
and separate property.
3. Such action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction.
4. In any case where parents shall be entitled to such damages, either the
father or mother may sue alone therefor, but recovery by one of such parties shall
be a bar to suit brought by the other.
Id.
The first Dram Shop statute in New York was passed in 1873. See Note, Liability
Under the New York Dram Shop Act, 8 SYRAcusE L. REV. 252, 253 (1957). The original
purpose of the act "was to correct the evils resulting from excessive drinking '. . . such as
impoverishment of families, injuries to others, and the creation of public burdens.'" Recent
Decisions, 31 ALB. L. REv. 167, 168 (1967) (quoting JOYCE, THE LAW RELATIVE TO INTOXICAT-
ING LIQuoR 476 (1910)). This statute imposed liability on several potential defendants, in-
cluding the commercial seller's landlord. See Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 514, 525-26
(1878). New York State's current Dram Shop Act, however, is primarily concerned with
providing compensation to those suffering injuries due to the unlawful sale of alcohol. See
Scheu v. High-Forest Corp., 129 App. Div. 2d 366, 368, 517 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (3d Dep't
1987).
Under the current statute, persons with standing to sue are those who are "injured in
person, property, means of support, or otherwise by an intoxicated person." GOL § 11-
101(1) (McKinney 1978). Therefore, the statute protects two classes of plaintiffs: those di-
rectly injured by the intoxicated individual and those who suffer a loss of support as a result
of his or her acts. See Recent Decisions, supra, at 169. Those who sue for support may
include parents of the intoxicated, see McNally v. Addis, 65 Misc. 2d 204, 224, 317 N.Y.S.2d
157, 178 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970), as well as his or her spouse and children, see
Valicenti v. Valenze, 108 App. Div. 2d 300, 303, 488 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (3d Dep't 1985).
The most significant restriction of the class of permissible plaintiffs is that the intoxi-
cated person has no cause of action. See Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 523,
523-24, 240 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (1st Dep't 1963), afl'd, 14 N.Y.2d 792, 200 N.E.2d 212, 251
N.Y.S.2d 30 (1964). This restriction is imposed because an intoxicated person "is guilty of
complicity in procuring the liquor himself." Recent Decisions, supra, at 169.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 265. In 1987, fourteen states had Dram Shop Acts. Id.
By imposing this type of liability, the states are easing the cost victims, their families, and
society as a whole must bear due to these accidents by spreading "the costs of alcohol-
related injuries among those persons whom legislatures or courts presume can afford to bear
and distribute these costs." See Note, supra note 2, at 837.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has gone beyond vendor liability to impose liability on
a social host in order to ease the burden on the victim of an of alcohol-related accident. See
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984) (social host liable to injured
third party if he serves alcohol "knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereaf-
ter be operating a motor vehicle").
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tablishes the necessary elements of the cause of action,5 it does not
include an applicable period of limitations.6 Under New York law,
if a particular statute creating a cause of action does not specify a
statute of limitations, the CPLR will provide the applicable pe-
riod.7 Recently, in Bongiorno v. D.LG.L, Inc.," the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department, held that the three-year period specified
in CPLR 214(2),' rather than the two-year wrongful death limita-
tion, is the applicable statute of limitations in a Dram Shop action
5 See GOL § 11-101(1) (McKinney 1978). There are four elements for liability under
the Dram Shop Act: "(1) unlawful sale, (2) of liquor, (3) to an intoxicated person which (4)
cause[s] injury." McNally, 65 Misc. 2d at 209, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 164-65.
In order to determine if there has been an unlawful sale, there must be a "prohibited
sale" as that term is defined by section 65 of the Alcohol Beverage Control Law. See Kohler
v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 857, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1982). A
prohibited sale is defined as the selling, delivering, or giving of alcohol to: "1. Any person,
actually or apparently, under the age of twenty-one years; 2. Any visibly intoxicated person;
3. Any habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense any alco-
holic beverages." N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1987).
In analyzing the fourth element, causation, courts have held that a remote proximate
cause is sufficient for imposition of liability. See McNally, 65 Misc. 2d at 209-10, 317
N.Y.S.2d at 165. Required is "'some practical or reasonable connection between the act it
makes wrongful and the injuries sustained.'" Id. at 210, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (quoting Dag-
gett v. Keshner, 284 App. Div. 733, 738, 135 N.Y.S.2d 524, 529 (2d Dep't 1954)). In order to
meet the burden of proving causation, the plaintiff "must establish that the accident oc-
curred while the consumer was intoxicated and that the sale contributed to the intoxication
in the slightest degree." Id. (citations omitted).
I See GOL § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1989).
7 See CPLR 201 (McKinney 1972). CPLR 201 provides that:
An action, including one brought in the name or for the benefit of the state,
must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different
time is prescribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No
court shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.
Id.
Article 2 of the CPLR "encompasses the principal periods of limitation, and rules gov-
erning their application." 2 CARMODY-WAIT 2D, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 13:2,
at 297 (1965). See generally T. Mmvis, NEw YORK PRAcuICE UNDER THE CPLR 96-114 (6th
ed. 1986) (listing various periods of limitations included in article 2).
The purpose of a statute of limitations is "to spare the courts from litigation of stale
claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses
have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost." Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325
U.S. 304, 314 (1945). The running of the limitations period, however, does not always pre-
vent a claim from being heard; it is classified as an affirmative defense and deemed waived
unless raised in the defendant's answer or by motion to dismiss. See CPLR 3211(e) (McKin-
ney 1989). See generally 1 WK&M % 201.03, at 2-13-2-14 (1988) (reviewing history of New
York statute of limitations from 1829 to present).
138 App. Div. 2d 120, 529 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1988).
See CPLR 214(2) (McKinney Supp. 1989). The statute provides in pertinent part
that: "The following action[] must be commenced within three years: ... 2. an action to
recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute .... ." Id.
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brought by an estate.1"
In Bongiorno, Nancy Alfonso was killed in an automobile acci-
dent while riding as a passenger.11 Almost three years later, the
plaintiff, as administratrix, instituted an action against two social
clubs.12 The claim asserted that the driver had been served an ex-
cessive amount of liquor while at the defendant New Bay Club in
East Quogue, New York.'3 It was also alleged that the driver of the
second car involved in the accident had been served excessive alco-
hol by the codefendant Neptune Beach Club. 14
In their answers, the defendants pleaded the expiration of the
statute of limitations.15 The defendants argued that the plaintiff's
claim was in essence an action for wrongful death disguised as a
Dram Shop action, and therefore section 5-4.1 of the EPTL, the
wrongful death statute of limitations, was applicable.16 Further-
more, the defendants asserted that even if the action was properly
classified as one under the Dram Shop Act, section 5-4.1 should
still apply since the legislature did not provide a statute of limita-
tions in the Dram Shop Act.' 7 In response, the plaintiff moved for
dismissal of the defendants' affirmative defense, and the Supreme
Court, Special Term, granted the plaintiff's motion.18
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, unani-
mously affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, holding that in a
Dram Shop action the applicable period of limitation is three years
under CPLR 214(2).'" Writing for the court, Justice Kooper ob-
served that the plaintiff's action was one properly brought under
the Dram Shop Act, and was not an action for wrongful death as
10 See Bongiorno, 138 App. Div. 2d at 127-28, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
Id. at 122, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
"Id. On July 16, 1984, approximately one year after the accident, plaintiff had insti-
tuted a suit against the drivers and owners of the two cars involved in the accident. Id.
Is Id.
14 Id.
' See Bongiorno v. D.I.G.I., Inc., 135 Misc. 2d 516, 517, 515 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk County 1987), aff'd, 138 App. Div. 2d 120, 529 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1988).
16 Id. EPTL section 5-4.1 provides in pertinent part that "an action to recover damages
for a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent's death ... must be com-
menced within two years after the decedent's death." EPTL § 5-4.1(1) (McKinney Supp.
1989) (emphasis added). Application of this statute would have resulted in dismissal of the
plaintiff's cause of action since it was brought two years and ten months after the decedents
death. See Bongiorno, 138 App. Div. 2d at 122, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
17 Bongiorno, 138 App. Div. 2d at 125, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
'8 Id. at 122-23, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
'9 Id. at 128, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
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the defendants contended. 20 In addition, the court refused to ac-
cept the defendants' contention that by failing to provide a period
of limitations, the legislature must have intended that all death
actions be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to
wrongful death.21 The court concluded that since the Dram Shop
Act was a statutorily-created liability,2 2 the proper statute of limi-
tations governing the action was the time prescribed by CPLR
214(2).23
By rejecting the statute of limitations defense, the Bongiorno
court furthered the underlying purpose of a Dram" Shop action-
providing a means to compensate the victims of alcohol-related ac-
cidents. 24 Moreover, the court's decision further supports the ac-
cepted principle that a Dram Shop action is separate and distinct
from a wrongful death action.25 It should be noted, however, that
20 Id. at 124, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 806. The defendants claimed that the pleadings closely
resembled an action pursuant to section 5-4.1 of the EPTL. Id. at 123-24, 529 N.Y.S.2d at
806. Among the items that the defendants contended resembled a wrongful death claim
were the fact that the action was brought by the administratrix of the decedent's estate, and
that the action in essence sought recovery of "pecuniary damages" and "funeral ex-
penses"--the types of damages usually sought in a wrongful death action. Id.
21 Id. at 125-26, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The court further stated that a Dram Shop action
is separate and distinct from a wrongful death action, referring to McNally v. Addis, 65
Misc. 2d 204, 223, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157, 178 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970). Bongiorno,
138 App. Div. 2d at 126, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 807. One difference the court pointed to was the
fact that a wrongful death action does not create an independent illegality since it is availa-
ble to a distributee "only if the decedent would himself have had a cause of action against
the defendant and based on the defendant's commission of a 'wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault.'" Id. at 127, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (quoting EPTL § 5-4.1(1)). On the other hand, the
Dram Shop Act creates a separate and distinct cause of action "even where the individual
whose death gives rise to the injuries sustained would himself possess no cause of action
under the Act." Id. For example, according to the court's rationale, if the decedent was the
intoxicated party, the decedent's dependents would have a cause of action even though the
decedent would not have one had he or she lived. See supra note 3 (intoxicated party barred
from suit).
22 Bongiorno, 138 App. Div. 2d at 128, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 808. Causes of action created by
statute are limited to those for which liability did not exist at common law. See Loengard v.
Santa Fe Indus., 573 F. Supp 1355, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Regional Transit Serv., 79 App. Div. 2d 858, 859, 434 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (4th Dep't 1983).
Since there was no Dram Shop action at common law, the court considered it to be a statu-
torily-created liability. See Bongiorno, 138 App. Div. 2d at 127, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
22 Bongiorno, 138 App. Div. 2d at 128, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
24 See supra notes 3-4 (discussing compensatory purposes and reasons for Dram Shop
Act). Commentators appear to have approved of the Bongiorno holding. See, e.g., 9A P.
ROHAN, NEw YORK CIvIL PRACIcE % 5-4.1[10], at 5-415 & n.78 (1988); Anderson, Three-
Year Statute Set on Dram Shop Suits, N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
2 See McNally, 65 Misc. 2d at 223, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 178; see also Dowling v. Stephan,
206 Misc. 518, 521, 133 N.Y.S.2d 667, 671 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954) (Dram Shop action
"creates a cause of action for the wife and child independent of and not created by Section
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given the holding in Morano v. St. Francis Hospital,26 the three-
year statute of limitations set by the Bongiorno court will not ap-
ply if the plaintiff's action is in reality a wrongful death claim hav-
ing as the basis of liability a violation of the Dram Shop Act.
In Morano, the plaintiff brought an action, based on allega-
tions of malpractice, approximately two years and six months after
her husband died.17 Subsequently, the defendants raised an argu-
ment similar to that raised in Bongiorno-that the plaintiff's ac-
tion was a wrongful death claim couched in the language of mal-
practice in order to take advantage of the longer period of
limitations.2 Here, however, the court granted defendant's motion,
concluding that the suit was in fact a wrongful death action and
the clear intention of section 5-4.1 of the EPTL was to allow a two-
year statute of limitations in wrongful death cases regardless of the
underlying conduct giving rise to the claim." It is submitted that
this is an appropriate result because it will prevent litigants from
mislabeling their actions in order to benefit from a longer statute
of limitations.
Although the Bongiorno court's choice of the three-year limi-
tations period for claims based upon the Dram Shop Act involved
determining a question of first impression,"0 the Bongiorno holding
is supported by an earlier holding of the Supreme Court, New
York County, that addressed the problem of whether to apply
CPLR 214(2) or the wrongful death statute of limitations in a
slightly different context. 1 In Commissioners of State Insurance
130 of the Decedent Estate Law" (former wrongful death statute)).
28 100 Misc. 2d 621, 420 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1979).
217 See id. at 623, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 94. Specifically, plaintiffs husband died on November
12, 1972, and she brought the action on May 12, 1975. Id. at 622-23, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 93-94.
The claim for malpractice arose after the plaintiff had a pathologist perform an autopsy on
her husband, which indicated "foreign objects" in the body. Id.
28 Id. at 623, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
28 Id. at 625, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 95. The court also decided that the malpractice discovery
statute, section 203 of the CPLR, does not apply in a wrongful death action. Id. The court,
however, did allow the plaintiff the right to amend her complaint to include a cause of
action for conscious pain and suffering pursuant to section 11-3.2 of the EPTL. Id. at 625-
26, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
30 Other states have been faced with the problem of choosing a statute of limitations for
Dram Shop Acts. Among those states are Illinois, see Desiron v. Peloza, 308 Ill. App. 582, 32
N.E.2d 316 (1941), and Michigan, see Cussans v. Harris, 118 Mich. App. 567, 325 N.W.2d
793 (1982).
31 See Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Empire Trust Co., 184 Misc. 947, 55 N.Y.S.
631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945). Although the New York courts have not often dealt with
the problem of choosing between CPLR 214(2) and the wrongful death statute of limita-
[Vol. 63:175
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Fund v. Empire Trust Co.,32 the insurance carrier of the defendant
employer brought suit to recover money paid out for the death of
an employee caused by the employer's negligence." As in Bongi-
orno, the defendants pleaded the running of the two-year statute
of limitations under a wrongful death action. 4 The court rejected
this argument, holding that the insurance carrier's cause of action
was a statutorily-created penalty which was separate and distinct
from a wrongful death action, and was therefore within the pur-
view of section 49 of the CPA, CPLR 214(2)'s predecessor.3  The
decision to apply section 49 instead of the wrongful death statute
of limitations parallels the Bongiorno court's decision to apply
CPLR 214(2).
By firmly establishing that CPLR section 214(2) is the appli-
cable statute of limitations in an estate's cause of action under the
Dram Shop Act, the Bongiorno court provided the practitioner
with a useful guideline for future litigation that is especially im-
portant in light of the fatal nature of statute of limitations errors.
Although the three-year limitations period is applicable to actions
by estates, practitioners must remain wary because actions brought
under the Dram Shop Act directly by dependents of the decedent
tions, they have frequently discussed the applicability of CPLR 214(2) to statutorily-created
rights. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 307, 448 N.E.2d 86, 93,
461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 239 (1983) (three-year, statutorily-created liability period of limitations
applies to claim based on age discrimination); DeGiacomo v. Kissinger, 62 App. Div. 2d
1048, 1048, 404 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (2d Dep't 1978) (mew.) (actions under GML § 207-c
governed by CPLR 214(2)); Conrad v. Home & Auto Loan Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 48, 51, 385
N.Y.S.2d 979, 981 (4th Dep't 1976) (CPLR 214(2) applies to action under New York Bank-
ing Law). CPLR 214(2) has also been applied in cases involving federal statutes. See, e.g.,
Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 1980) (CPLR
214(2) applicable in suits involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Federal Civil Rights Law); Hornblower
& Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (actions
under Federal Securities Exchange Act subject to CPLR 214(2)).
32 184 Misc. 947, 55 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
33 Id. at 948, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The insurance carriers, pursuant to subdivision 5 of
section 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, sought to recover $2,000 from the employer,
claiming that the employee's death was due to the employer's negligence. Id. at 947-48, 55
N.Y.S.2d at 631. The statute, however, does not include a specific statute of limitations. See
N.Y. WORK. Comsp. LAW § 29(5) (McKinney 1965).
, See Empire Trust Co., 184 Misc. at 948, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 632. At the time this suit was
brought, the wrongful death statute was codified in section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law.
Id.
35 Id. at 948, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The court concluded that the action was instituted to
recover a penalty under the Workmen's Compensation Law and, therefore, the statute of
limitations governing penalties applied. Id.
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may be governed by the two-year wrongful death statute of limita-
tions. Overall, however, the Bongiorno decision will improve judi-
cial efficiency to the extent that courts will not have to spend time
deciding issues extraneous to the merits and litigants will not
waste judicial resources by asserting unwarranted statute of limita-
tions defenses.
Olympia Bizekis
CPLR 3121: In a child custody action, production of a potential
custodian's hair sample for drug testing is reasonable and rele-
vant
CPLR 3121(a) permits a party to an action to compel the
physical, mental, or blood examination of another party" when the
latter's physical, mental, or blood condition is in controversy.' A
1 CPLR 3121(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Although CPLR 3121(a) makes no explicit
provision for the testing of corporeal samples other than blood, any relevant test given as
part of a physical examination authorized by this provision generally would be permitted.
See id., commentary at 571 (McKinney 1970); 3A WK&M 1 3121.02, at 31-430 (1988); see,
e.g., Adlerstein v. South Nassau Communities Hasp., 109 Misc. 2d 158, 164, 439 N.Y.S.2d
605, 610 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (in medical malpractice action alleging sterility,
plaintiff required to submit semen sample for physical examination); Cardinal v. University
of Rochester, 188 Misc. 823, 825-26, 71 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615-17 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1946)
(X-rays, urine sample, stomach pumping), aft'd, 271 App. Div. 1048, 69 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th
Dep't 1947).
2 CPLR 3121(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988); see, e.g., Fisher v. Fossett, 45 Misc. 2d 757,
758, 257 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965) (in property damage action where
driver's defense would be based on blacking out, physical condition was in controversy).
The moving party bears the burden of proving that the condition is in controversy. See
Soybel v. Gruber, 132 Misc. 2d 343, 346, 504 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1986). This showing may be made either by reference to the other party's affirmative injec-
tion of the matter into dispute or by offering substantiation of the condition's relevancy. Cf.
id. (plaintiff landlord's unsupported assertion that eighty-four-year-old tenant too ill to
maintain her apartment did not place tenant's condition in controversy). An allegation of
personal injury in a suit for damages subjects that party to a physical examination at the
request of the other party. See, e.g., Evens v. Denny's, Inc., 129 Misc. 2d 767, 768, 494
N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1985) (plaintiff initiating personal injury action
brings physical condition into controversy); Adlerstein, 109 Misc. 2d at 161, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
608 (same). In cases not involving personal injury, a party may affirmatively inject his or her
physical condition into dispute by referring to it either during pretrial examination or in the
pleadings. See, e.g., Wegman v. Wegman, 37 N.Y.2d 940, 941, 343 N.E.2d 288, 288, 380
N.Y.S.2d 649, 649 (1975) (in divorce action, wife who counterclaimed for alimony alleging
her poor health put her condition in controversy); Nalbandian v. Nalbandian, 117 App. Div.
